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Article
Is There a Crisis of Sustainable Development?

Edward Sankowski and Betty J. Harris*
This article argues that there is a crisis of sustainable development. Sustainable
development may mean a value system, but also may mean a set of societal development
processes, manifested in political economy and culture. One crisis of sustainable
development in either meaning arises from a combination of elements under neoliberalism.
We stress three. (1) Sustainable development includes complex demands about justice.
These involve conflicts among neoliberal justice and rival more philosophically plausible
concepts of justice. (2) Care for the environment (basic to sustainable development) is
complex, and generates multiple sometimes, conflicting demands on decision-making. (3)
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Persisting unresolved conflicts from the Cold War period continue to generate normative
issues about political economy and culture. This suggests that attention must be paid to
ethical conflicts unresolved with the “end” of the Cold War, (conflicts grown sharper
today, given neoliberalism), if we are to understand and resolve one main crisis of
sustainable development.

1.
This paper argues that there is a crisis of sustainable development. (That is, there is at least
one such crisis, as we will mostly continue to phrase it; or there are a number of related
crises). To call this a crisis is not to shorten the time frame of the events. At a minimum,
the crisis of sustainable development as addressed here extends from the 1980s to the
present and the immediate future. As we discuss later, sustainable development may mean
a value system, but also may mean a set of societal development processes, manifested in
the political economy and culture. The crisis of sustainable development in either meaning
arises from a combination of elements. We mention three elements next.

2.
One element of the crisis is that sustainable development in its canonical form as a value
system includes complex demands about justice (sometimes “equity”). If we take justice
seriously (not, for example, in its neoliberal versions, which are implausible from a
normative ethics point of view) the requirements of sustainable development will tend to
be either puzzling as to what their content and priorities are, or if made definite, complex
and quite likely rather radical if the wording of the value system is taken seriously. If
radical, then the gap between sustainable development and actual global political economy
and culture will be so great that one type of crisis is discernible, a vast gap between affirmed
values and social reality.
Another element of the crisis (or crises) of sustainable development is that the
notion of care for the environment (so basic to sustainable development in its canonical
form) is quite complex and generates multiple demands on decision-making. This is a point
well made by Amartya Sen, particularly in an article published in The New Republic (Sen
2014). Beyond the examples stressed by Sen, we need to cope with not only global
warming, but atmospheric pollution, threats to biodiversity, problems of urbanization,
agriculture, population growth, mass immigration, land reform, etc. Many such
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environmentalist demands will also have radical implications. Not least, dealing with
poverty on much of the planet requires economic development, plausibly construed, as Sen
says. There is arguably a “right to sustainable development” or something akin to that,
which has force about poorer regions of the world.
Another element of one type of crisis of sustainable development is that
continuing unresolved results from the Cold War period continue to raise normative issues
about political economy and culture. Those conflicts were and are conflicts of power
politics (as we might phrase it) but they were and are also to some extent conflicts of
normative ethics and normative socio-political visions, however much of those visions
were submerged in mere conflicts of power. Capitalism has not been entirely reducible to
crude greed, and Adam Smith was much subtler than typically understood; communism
has never been entirely reducible to state-bureaucratic lust for control, and Karl Marx was
far deeper than that. (Putting it this way does not imply a false equivalence between
capitalism and communism.) This suggests that some attention must be paid to ethical
issues unresolved with the “end” of the Cold War, if we are to understand the crisis of
socio-economic development depicted as a crisis of sustainable development.

3.
The crisis of sustainable development can be considered a global legitimation crisis, a crisis
of the world system. The crisis can be articulated in part by interpreting the relationship in
recent decades (mainly from the 1980s to the present) between sustainable development
and the apparent end of the Cold War between capitalism and communism (and the
expansion of what this essay calls neoliberalism, e.g., especially as marked in the U.S. and
UK by the Reagan and Thatcher regimes, with their consequences for other parts of the
world).
We stress two features of sustainable development that are actually indissolubly
conjoined if both are well understood: environmentalism and the social justice
commitments of sustainable development. In some circumstances, environmentalism in a
less than robust form is advocated in a way that downplays the social justice aspects of
sustainable development. This generates one crisis within sustainable development as a
value system or set of social processes. For real-world sustainable development to live up
to its more attractive and demanding value-system versions, the multiple demands of
environmentalism must be acknowledged and integrated with an ideal of global social
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justice that has dimensions never yet adequately expressed and supported, but about which
we around the world have some shared intuitions. The intuitions, if shared by any of
multiple groups, may well prompt constructive social activism. The results of such an
integration of environmentalism and global social justice would suggest some ways in
which the ideologies and practices of Cold War capitalism and communism (sometimes
expressed in hot wars by proxy) were both seriously defective. Moreover, the self-styled
victory of capitalism with the end of the Cold War (as well as the recent metamorphoses
of capitalism) still leaves us with neither an adequate environmentalism nor social justice
in critically adequate formulations (nor do we have a plausible route to greater social justice
and more plausible care for the environment). Liberal democracy in its primarily capitalist
versions is dramatically failing adequately to address problems of environmentalism or
social justice, or their combination. In some cases, notoriously, liberal democracy is
apparently in danger of devolving into authoritarian “illiberal democracy.” The problem is
not, as Francis Fukuyama apparently now wishes to argue, something about identity
politics and “the politics of resentment” (Fukuyama 2018). Rather, conditions for the
ethical legitimacy of the global order will be impossible to understand or approximate in
real practices unless sustainable development or some more truthful and stronger successor
doctrine and set of processes gains traction internationally.

4.
The mention of Fukuyama is worth briefly elaborating on. With the supposed end of the
Cold War, Fukuyama argued that ideology had ended, and he anticipated the increasing
international role of liberal democracy, conjoined with a market economy (Fukuyama
1992). Fukuyama now (in 2018) regards his earlier self (at that time of capitalist
triumphalism) as “conservative,” a phase he apparently now thinks he has outgrown. (His
arguments and rhetoric, however, suggest otherwise.) Fukuyama appears now to be
engaging in a re-thinking of his earlier views about the end of the Cold War and the
subsequent problems faced by the world system, despite what appeared to be the victory
of liberal democracy plus markets and the end of ideology. We will not launch into a
detailed discussion of Fukuyama. But he is relevant to our essay particularly because he
has seriously underestimated the moral flaws of what he called the market economy,
including its worst threats to the environment and justice, and has failed to understand the
potential for neoliberal and authoritarian “populist” excesses of evolving capitalist political
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economy. Fukuyama misdiagnoses the ills of the current time because he avoids a critique
of neoliberalism and rather turns to criticism of ideas about identity politics.

5.
We do find it interesting also that a Marxist critic of Fukuyama, Slavoj Žižek, has
repeatedly criticized Fukuyama’s end of ideology view. What is most relevant about Žižek
to this essay is an environmentalist/social justice aspect of part of Žižek’s critique of
Fukuyama. On Žižek’s view, one of the apocalyptic features of our current global situation
is that there is an environmental catastrophe looming, as well as major problems of social
justice symbolized most dramatically by widespread apartheid (whether or not South
Africa in particular has ended legal apartheid), walls and exclusion (Žižek 2016). (The
Trump example of a wall between the U.S. and Mexico is instructive in this regard.) The
end of the Cold War and the ascendancy of markets, particularly in their global capitalist
forms, for Žižek, only continued and accelerated problems of justice and
environmentalism.
Moreover, Žižek shows some signs of subscribing to a deflationary, negative view
about sustainable development. He suggests that the global antagonism between the
Included (more privileged) and the Excluded (those impoverished, the refugees, etc.) is the
key one for understanding four dimensions of apocalypse: “without it, all others lose their
subversive edge. Ecology turns into a problem of sustainable development…” (Žižek 2016:
113). For Žižek, it seems that sustainable development is an ideological construct, in a
Marxist sense of ideology (supplemented by Lacanian psychoanalysis, in Žižek’s version).
The key global antagonism, according to Žižek, “is ultimately a question of justice” (Žižek
2016: 114).
It is of particular interest that in his attempt to reformulate “communism” for the
current moment, Žižek stresses the concept of “the commons” and egalitarianism, while
apparently regarding the real politics of twentieth-century communism as having come to
a dead end. “The enclosure of the commons” is used as a metaphor by Žižek for (unjust)
privatization in many domains of the contemporary global political economy and culture.
The historical metaphorical allusion to land enclosures suggests what should be
emphasized as part of environmentalism: major environmental topics include not only
problems about global warming and air pollution, but also frequently connected problems
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about land ownership and land use. All this is at once very abstract and metaphorical, but
suggestive.
What is missing from Žižek’s scheme is a more definite positive strategy and
action plan that would link (among other matters) the overcoming of and progress beyond
capitalism with either enhanced justice and/or improved environmental conditions.
Independently of all this, Žižek still displays ample interest in mulling over the history and
documents of twentieth century communism and/or Marxist theorists (of one sort or
another) ambiguously related to actual societal phenomena with “communist” dimensions.
What this suggests to the authors of this article is that (despite his occasional protestations
to the contrary) Žižek wants to retrieve something of value from twentieth-century
Marxism and real-world communism that possibly survives the end of the Cold War,
something that might help supply a direction for current theory and practice. That is still
an obscure object of desire, but clearly justice and improvements meeting environmental
concerns are part of what he wants to advance. But as yet, he says most about critique of
ideology rather than definite proposed alternatives. Moreover, he seems aware of this lack.
Our way of interpreting Žižek on the environment and social justice fits in with
our general view that the end of the Cold War should be understood as crucial for defining
and evaluating sustainable development. Indeed, unless we all come to understand the
implications of the end of the Cold War not only for formerly communist countries, but
also for the West (and other parts of the world), we will be lacking in understanding of the
problems and possibilities for sustainable development, and lacking in understanding of
the crisis of sustainable development.

6.
Referring to sustainable development, as already indicated above, may designate a value
system or a set of social processes. The classical explicit formulation of the value system
is in the Brundtland Report of 1987, a collective product of a three-year effort by The
World Commission on Environment and Development, a United Nations commission
composed of representatives from various countries, some capitalist, some communist,
some non-aligned. The effort was coordinated by Gro Harlem Brundtland.
The Brundtland Report has been notably updated in a sense by the 2015 UN
Sustainable Development Goals, but these “SDGs” do not seem to have replaced much of
the basic Brundtland Report value system, except by some elaboration of an account of
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normative priorities (United Nations 2015). Here the truth becomes more complicated.
While in a sense the basic value system might be the same or similar in the Brundtland
Report and in the 2015 SDGs, the 2015 SDGs have occasioned criticisms about their
allegedly implausible assumptions and the absence of a critical dimension about neoliberal
capitalism. “An Open Letter to the United Nations,” signed by various critics including
Noam Chomsky, Thomas Pogge, and others, exemplifies such criticisms. They write:
As the UN and the world’s governments ratify the Sustainable
Development Goals (SDGs) today (September 25), we must be clear that
they do not represent the best interests of the world’s majority—those
that are currently exploited and oppressed within the current economic
and political order….
It is possible to overcome poverty in a way that respects the
Earth and helps tackle climate change. The planet is abundant in wealth
and its people infinitely resourceful. In order to do so, however, we must
be prepared to challenge the logic of endless growth, greed and
destruction enshrined in neoliberal capitalism.
It is time to envision a new operating system, based on social
justice and symbiosis with the natural world. As currently formulated,
the SDGs merely distract us from addressing the challenges we face.
(Ladha 2015)
Before and after the issuing of the Brundtland Report, the world was undergoing
changes that might be summarized as increasing global capitalist marketization. The socalled end of the Cold War diminished the anxieties of some persons in many parts of the
world about the conflict between capitalism and communism. Fears of nuclear
confrontation somewhat subsided, for a time. Even in societies such as China, with its
official Marxist self-understanding, socialism with Chinese characteristics came to include
an important role for “markets” (in some sense of the term). In much of the former Soviet
bloc, e.g., Poland from 1989 on, explicit emphasis on free markets became common. 1
It seemed, in 1989 and later, especially to many observers in the primarily
capitalist world, that capitalism had won. Some, such as Francis Fukuyama, optimistically
projected a bright future for liberal democratic societal organization that included (and for
many, still is said to include) what were interpreted as capitalist market institutions
(Fukuyama 1992).
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In retrospect, as is widely though not universally conceded, much of the optimism
seems to have been questionable. Market ideology intensified to the point that some saw
capitalist markets as in many respects preferably replacing the functions of the democratic
state. The value system of democracy has come to seem all too often irrelevant to the real
course of events, too often “ideological” in the bad sense. (And might this apply to many
pronouncements about “sustainable development,” as Žižek implies?) Some contemporary
commentators emphasize the early 1980s as the beginnings of an intensifying of what is
often called neoliberalism. It is characteristic of neoliberalism to identify justice, in
particular, with what would result from the workings of a well-arranged market economy
(and presumably accompanying institutions). At the very least, neoliberalism must by
definition assume that much of social activity should accept and abide by the logic of
capitalist markets. (Admittedly, what markets exactly consist in is less clear than is often
assumed by apostles of marketization, or even by critics of markets.)

7.
During the period of increasing marketization, sustainable development also came to be
widely invoked as a value system. Between 1987 and the present (as we write in 2018)
countries with very varied political economic arrangements (and many types of institutions,
governmental and non-governmental) declared themselves in favor of sustainable
development. There were objections by some individuals and groups to the value system,
to be sure, but it is striking how much (at least in a verbal sense) sustainable development
became an element in a frequently affirmed global framework that for most countries
included a major and growing role for “markets.”
Justice considerations, however, clearly could never really be reduced to the
processes and outcomes of markets, even idealized markets. Adapting a version of
philosopher G.E. Moore’s “open question” argument (devised by Moore for a different
ethical purpose), it would always be meaningful to ask about the processes and outcomes
of markets, or market-centered political economies, “Is this just?” (Moore 1903).

8.
To recapitulate, sustainable development as a value system, as enunciated in the
Brundtland Report, had two major parts. In part it was an expression of multifaceted
concern with an intention to address globally shared problems about environmental issues
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broadly construed. In a second respect, sustainable development was also an expression of
concern and attempt to address problems about equity or social justice (and justice in varied
contexts, some intra-national, some international). Oddly, some later environmentalist (and
other) writers overlook or downplay the full and explicit social justice component of
sustainable development. This is not solely a matter of justice among the current generation
and future generations (as is often emphasized), but also a matter of justice among
contemporaries, within the nation-state, and on a global scale. An anti-poverty goal was
always fundamental to sustainable development. That is even more obvious in the 2015
Sustainable Development Goals.
Sustainable development, however, as presented in the Brundtland Report, was
never advanced together with any philosophically sophisticated or pragmatically powerful
account of social justice. The Brundtland Report stressed priority for assistance to the worst
off, and made many normative ethical and normative political judgments about particular
problems, but offered no normatively detailed analysis or justification for its nonetheless
often intuitively plausible claims about justice. Yet its claims about justice resonated
powerfully among many persons, even as the claims were typically disregarded by
corporate or bureaucratic elites in practice. The Brundtland Report addressed itself to all
persons, but also to trans-national corporations, as if such organizations might come to be
more sincerely and effectively mindful of the demands of social justice and
environmentalism.
The drift of the Brundtland Report on sustainable development was and is that the
world faces “A Common Future.” This can be interpreted (admittedly somewhat
speculatively) as a suggestion that the world political economy (along with worldwide
various cultures) can be conceived as a system that generates reasons, even moral
obligations, which imply that the better-off parts of the world should assist the worse-off,
especially the worst-off. The Brundtland Report emphasizes assistance for the worst-off.
The prematurely hailed end of communism then left the more capitalist countries
with often-alleged obligations to assist (or in some accounts, buy off or buy up) the worseoff communist countries, if the latter would accept such assistance or such a sale. We might
ponder the situation of West Germany after re-unification, desiring but even (by its own
lights) obligated to include the formerly communist East in its development plans. True
enough, there were formerly national and cultural affinities in this case between the
capitalist and formerly communist regions that made it plausible to have the attitude that
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development after re-unification must include poorer regions. It is much more difficult to
persuade societies that they have obligations to worse-off societies (even badly worse-off
societies) where there is an absence of such affinities as existed in the German reunification case. Within the European Union, at times struggling to foster attitudes favoring
mutual aid among member states, it is often far more difficult to persuade better-off
member states to provide substantial assistance to economically worse-off states (e.g.,
capitalist Switzerland with regard to formerly socialist/communist Poland, or more wellknown, Germany with regard to Greece).
Where barriers of bigoted race-consciousness are a factor, as in South Africa, and
pervasively but often more ideologically obscured elsewhere, the loss of Soviet support
(after the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the end of Russian communism) for the antiapartheid revolutionaries (such as Nelson Mandela and Joe Slovo) did not, with the end of
legal apartheid, result in an upwelling of sentiments among key players within the white
minority to overcome huge economic inequalities rooted in part in racial and ethnic
differences, which obviously persist. The lesser iconic figures beyond Mandela symbolize
the changes from a movement allied with the Soviet Union for some purposes, as with
Slovo’s membership in the South African Communist Party, and his military training in
the Soviet Union; Thabo Mbeki’s neoliberalism; Jacob Zuma’s authoritarian corruption;
and Cyril Ramaphosa’s post-transformation personal wealth derived from business.
In South Africa, land reform addressing racial injustice is one major continuing
unresolved issue that can be regarded as combining social justice and environmentalist
concerns, both said to be aspects of sustainable development. No apparent dynamic of
global or domestic capitalist markets arose after the end of formal apartheid to boost
movement significantly toward cross-racial equality. That is not at all to assume that Soviet
influence, if it had persisted, would have contributed to better results; that we do not know.
It does seem, nonetheless, that within the circumstances of a global political economy
dominated by neo-liberalism, and given domestic South African property arrangements
inherited from the apartheid era, formal legal equality and “democratic” elections have not
been enough to overcome prior political/economic inequality and cultural/racial
differences. Signs that Cyril Ramiphosa might move forward on land reform were met with
recent criticisms from the current Trump administration in the U.S., despite Trump’s
tendency towards insistence on the value of national sovereignty. Apparently national
sovereignty does not, for Trump, imply that South Africans should be left to address their
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own major problems about land distribution and housing. Trump, of course, also
exaggerated the problem of murders of white farmers in South Africa, thereby attempting
to further inflame racial divisions in both South Africa and the U.S. The most recent phase
of capitalist practice in the U.S. combines increasingly authoritarian capitalism in the
political economy, along with sometimes concealed neoliberalism, with racism on the
cultural front, and there have been attempts to export elements of all this in U.S. influence
abroad.

9.
Trump’s own erratic decision-making about economic policy, including his ad hoc
decisions about tariffs, constitutes an odd phase in the global capitalist order. His policies
could reasonably be construed as a thorough-going repudiation of the value system of
sustainable development as expressed in the Brundtland Report and the 2015 SDGs. One
might have thought that such incursions as Trump’s into the “market” economy, incursions
by a U.S. President, would be widely regarded as questionable by market fundamentalists.
To some extent, among his followers, Trump’s self-proclaimed savvy as a businessman
(despite his track record of bankruptcies) arguably provides mass psychological and
propagandistic cover amongst many Trump supporters about what might otherwise be
regarded as governmental interference with free markets. Probably Trump’s furthering of
tax cuts for the wealthy and environmental protection deregulation, particularly his
championing of fossil fuel industries against concerns by environmentally progressive
elements, and his desire for governmental/corporate appropriation of public land for private
economic exploitation, have reduced major anxieties or suspicions among his most
influential supporters, in the donor class and among economically humbler-status folk, (had
doubts much have ever arisen) that Trump is violating pieties about free market capitalism.
There is money to be made by the fortunately situated under the circumstances of the
Trump administration, and this overcomes the qualms that might have been greater among
the well-off. Indeed, the ideology of free market capitalism moving along without
governmental favors has always been illusory, and has probably been recognized as
illusory by cynical profiteers. There is now a comparative absence (compared with the Cold
War period) of communist alternatives abroad (with the possible exception of China, which
now has its own version of a political economy that includes markets) that might seriously
threaten capitalist hegemony within the U.S. Talk of “socialism” in the U.S. is often the
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expression of a desire to hold onto or recover benefits for everyday people of an FDR New
Deal type. The absence of the most threatening oppositional politics after the
diminishment, end, or alteration of communism (with China, for example, at times
becoming perceived as a troublesome trade partner in global market relations rather than a
power threatening to infiltrate the U.S. system) allows the eccentric behavior of Trump, a
kleptocratic, authoritarian would-be strongman, to represent the viewpoint of U.S.
capitalism to an often bewildered assortment of liberal democratic and other world leaders
and global institutions. However, there are also some current signs of what is beginning to
be called a new Cold War between China and the U.S., manifested, e.g., in charges that
China has been trying to infiltrate U.S. universities through its influence on educational
programs.
How U.S. political economy and culture descended to the level of Trumpism is a
long story, which many have been trying to write, but which is beyond our scope here.
Trump deserves mention, however, since he has managed both to savage the environment
and worsen economic inequality, and thus his program runs entirely counter even to
comparatively moderate versions of sustainable development. At the same time, there are
many elements of the U.S. system (even some for-profit corporations) that officially
subscribe to sustainable development as a value system. This is so at a time when Trump
is obviously a supporter of fossil fuels and a global warming denier.
Now there is no absolutely obvious reason, (causally or normatively construed),
why global corporate capitalism would necessarily have to favor fossil fuels and climate
change denial. No reason to be assigned without further explanation, that is, but rather there
is the hugely consequential contingent fact of the strategic and influential position of the
fossil fuel industry in the world economy. On September 9, 2018, even the Swedish
national elections resulted in a major advance of an extreme-right party that is sympathetic
to fossil fuel use. Not only is there much money concentrated in the global fossil fuel
industry, decisions across borders by interests that are invested in fossil fuels are a potential
rallying point for coordinated action (on matters beyond energy) that improves the
prospects of those in the fossil fuel industry and its associated businesses. Obviously, all
taken together, this is a very powerful force for environmental damage, damage that will
unjustly affect differently various countries, regions, individuals, generations, and so on.
There are plenty of unjustly distributed negative externalities here. Given the unjust and
contra-environmentalist configuration of the global socio-economic order, it may be our
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best collective hope that not only ethically motivated activism, but also self-interested
resistance by some coalition of public entities and private corporate entities (and even some
foundations such as the Rockefeller Brothers Fund) will counter the influence of the fossilfuel industries and their associated business allies. There are some signs of this.

10.
Then too, with some disturbing parallels to Trumpism in the capitalist U.S., some of the
countries that were once hailed as liberated in the transformation from communism to free
market capitalism are now frequently denounced as illiberal democracies. A clear example
is to be found in some of the so-called Visograd countries, the Czech Republic, Slovakia,
Poland, and Hungary. The clearest example of a self-avowed “illiberal democracy” is
Viktor Orbán’s Hungary. However, contemporary Poland is often suspected (fairly or
unfairly) of illiberal one-party tendencies. It is notable that Poland, the Czech Republic,
etc., also have records as countries with major environmental problems. Within Poland,
moreover, there is major economic inequality, e.g., manifested by the division between
urban and rural areas, and so-called Poland A (better off economically) and Poland B
(worse off economically). Global capitalism has not addressed this situation adequately
(although the EU has provided some assistance to Poland) Thereby global capitalism is de
facto encouraging the one-party-rule-tending “populist” nationalism decried by those more
sympathetic to global capitalism than is (perhaps) the current ruling party in Poland.
Arguably, by tolerating or worsening economic inequality, global neoliberal capitalism has
contributed to widespread fears and insecurities in many places. These fears and
insecurities are very probably part of what has inclined electorates in various troubled
would-be democracies to support authoritarian leaders and parties. The authoritarians tend
to make misleading promises of economic help to some insecure components of their
populations. The authoritarians tend also to promise greater support to some features of
“private” property systems and greater support to elected economic sectors that are under
pressure. The authoritarians tend to appeal to the desires of many for the preservation of
aspects of cultures that have often been dominant but which are threatened by potentially
changing circumstances. Such a pattern fits the U.S. and Brazil, for example. By now, there
are many examples of apparently authoritarian tendencies advancing in countries formerly
saluted in Western media as models of developing liberal democracy combined with free
market capitalism, cushioned to some extent by welfare state benefits; (authoritarian parties
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gaining support even in Germany and Italy). This can, of course, be interpreted as a social
justice problem, since democratic political arrangements can reasonably be regarded as an
embodiment of social justice in the distribution of a good, political power. Further east, in
the European land-mass, of course, is Russia, with its political authoritarianism, its
oligarchs frequently having enriched themselves by seizing advantages during the decline
of communism; and indebted to crony “capitalism,” its show of elections that affirm
autocracy, and its fossil-fuel commitments as well as its ambitions for expansion and desire
for greater global influence. Many of the authoritarian or authoritarian-tending countries
have serious environmental problems. “Market economies,” including descendants of the
Soviet Union and Soviet bloc national systems, albeit with major structural transformations
themselves in their political economies, all the while often denominate themselves as free
market democracies. As communism in its paradigmatic twentieth-century forms recedes
into the past in many places, though taking on some new forms, it becomes more and more
difficult to blame environmental problems on prior communism and its aftermath.
“Capitalist democracies” increasingly own the problems, and in many places, the
democratic part of the picture is also shaky under a combination of neoliberal or
authoritarian capitalism (sometimes capitalism functions uneasily side-by-side with
authoritarian nationalist tendencies). Indeed, it may be that the U.S. itself faces the danger
of one-party rule by what Noam Chomsky has called an “insurgency” of what may be the
most dangerous organization in human history, the Republican Party, now with a Trumpian
face. There may result (if pessimism is borne out) a greater resemblance than is widely
realized between the U.S. and the illiberal democracies in formerly communist-orbit
countries. Some pessimistic and fearful but intelligent commentators (e.g., Paul Krugman)
realize this. He has expressed a fear that the U.S. may become more like contemporary
Poland.

11.
Then too, as mentioned briefly above, we must also consider the possibility that there is a
new Cold War between latter-day “communism” (especially in China, which is a hard to
classify combination of Marxist self-definition and market relations, now regarded as
fundamentally “capitalist” by some observers) and Western capitalism in its current form,
(which is a hard to classify combination of conflict-ridden liberal democratic and
increasingly

authoritarian/nationalist/quasi-theocratic

regimes

misleadingly

called
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“populist”). The conceptions of social justice at work in these domains (“Marxist” and
“liberal democratic, linked with markets” or “authoritarian capitalist” as in parts of Eastern
Europe) is hardly inspiring, with vast inequalities in wealth and/or societal power
apparently becoming worse, on the social justice side, and spotty records at best on the
environmentalist side. In the U.S., the growth of inequality has been a topic of concerned
analysis and egalitarian-justice advocacy even by comparatively moderate though
“progressive” commentators such as the economist and public intellectual Joseph Stiglitz,
also a sometime subscriber to the ideals of sustainable development.
According to one U.S.-based apparently pro-Western-capitalism commentator on
China, the academic political scientist Minxin Pei, China is threatened with loss in a new
Cold War because of a variety of governance weaknesses (Pei 2018). Although both the
U.S. and China are major contributors to global scope environmental problems, China (at
the nation-state level) appears (even with backsliding) increasingly formidable as a world
power and probably more committed than the current U.S. nationalist regime to explicit
steps to further some key aspects of the environmentalism advocated by notable
formulations of sustainable development. The Trump version of capitalist political
economy, on the other hand, is notoriously neither committed to plausible values of social
justice nor environmentalism. And Trump’s ideology is notably infected by cultural racism
that seems to go far beyond politics and economics.
One example of the contrast between contemporary China and the U.S. about
environmentalism can be illustrated by nation-state level attitudes towards the 2015 Paris
Climate Accord. China remains signed on, whereas Trump, speaking for the U.S., wants to
exit. (That would undo an understanding between Barack Obama and Xi Jinping about coleading in the fight against climate change.) Many reasonable problems could be raised
about the adequacy of the accord, and about the Accord’s supposed serious significance
for sustainable development. Nonetheless, the difference in stance between China and the
U.S. is of more than merely symbolic significance about commitment to sustainable
development and multi-lateral decision-making, as well as deference to, and desire to
further global environmental consciousness, while lifting large numbers of Chinese
citizens out of poverty. This is not, however, to engage in apologetics for the
authoritarianism of China’s regime.
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12.
We might mention two lingering flaws in the psychology transmitted to some of us from
the Cold War period, which did not end with the events usually described as the end of the
Cold War. Both of these flaws have had consequences for the continuing role of sustainable
development.
One flaw is the dichotomized conception of capitalism and communism, an aspect
of a Manicheanism common during the Cold War. State planning and markets never were
necessarily entirely at odds with one another. The supposed evils of governmental planning
and regulation, e.g., even if pursued on grounds of environmental protection have been
denounced repeatedly (though selectively) by some business interests. In fact, markets
typically require both governmental and cultural norms, indeed, coercive law, to be
markets. It requires a lot of legal architectonic to make multi-national corporations
functional, for example. The very possibility of modern markets depends on the state and
cultural norms. Propaganda aside, markets are as much about coercion as free choice.
A second flaw from the Cold War period that did not end with the Cold War is a
tendency for those on the left (but not only the left) to frame their hopes for progressive
change in terms of dramatic, even catastrophic events that might finally teach the world a
lesson about environmentalism or socio-economic justice. The result of this shows up in
Žižek, for example, in his discussion of the contradictions of capitalism as leading to
apocalypse, “the end times,” and specifically in his focus on global warming and its huge
threats of disaster. Another example would be Noam Chomsky in this respect, who stresses
the threats of climate change and nuclear catastrophe.

13.
We would not at all challenge the idea that environmental problems pose a risk of major
disasters, even the end of much life on the planet. However, in order to educate people
about environmentalism, or social justice, we suspect apocalyptic warnings need to be
supplemented by more variegated attention to environmental issues. In order to engage and
motivate different individuals and population groups about a wider range of
environmentalist issues and the devising of solutions to such issues, we need attention to
shared matters of concern about the environment, for sure, but these will include both
catastrophic possibilities or likelihoods, and other serious matters (positive possibilities or
negative possibilities) about the environment.
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There may be a parallel here with more justice-focused attitudes about the
financial system, predictions of disaster, and other serious problems such as credit card
debt or student debt. There is no magical universally appropriate solution about how to
motivate and inform people so that they will care sufficiently to be activist about the
environment or about distributive justice in the financial and economic system. But
philosophy and psychology (and other social sciences) or some types of professional
practice might do well to contribute to design of educational campaigns that go beyond
(without discarding) warnings of disaster, and that reflect attitudinal and situational
differences in different regions and localities and among different classes of people about
perceived environmental challenges and economic injustices. Whether the resulting
collective efforts are classified as sustainable development activism, or in some other
(perhaps post-sustainability) terms, is perhaps less important than informing and
motivating intelligent environmental and economic-justice activism, out of which a new
understanding of sustainability, or a post-sustainability system of values (preserving the
best of sustainability) might emerge.
Thus, the crisis about sustainable development that is depicted in this essay is not
best understood as a crisis exclusively about an apocalypse. We do not deny the possibility
of global apocalypse, either due to financial deregulation or deregulation of environmental
protection measures. But we speculate that greater ingenuity should be devoted to inventing
and pursuing strategies about how to change minds, and to promote activism in ways that
can lead to progress about social justice and the environment (activism beyond averting
catastrophe).

14.
In what follows, in conclusion, we explore the possibility that the global network of
declarations in favor of sustainable development is not merely ideological obfuscation. The
network may contain examples that are indeed rank hypocrisy. But in some cases, even
then, the sustainable development value system may offer opportunities for inventing more
promising situationally specific strategies to address environmental matters and economic
justice problems, as well as combined environmental and economic justice issues.
Activism that focuses on preventing disasters need not be abandoned, but it can
be formulated in more varied and more effective ways through supplementation with
activism that is attentive to both a disaster focus and a more variegated environmental
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justice focus (one that pays attention to the contexts of even obfuscating ideological
affirmations of sustainable development by government, corporations, universities, etc.)
It has been noted by perceptive observers that disasters can be accommodated and
even welcomed as potential sources of profit within a corporate market political economy.
The rebuilding of communities after weather disasters, for example, or the devastation of
war can be a source of gain for some that is sometimes part of a ghoulish cycle. Insurance
policies, it has been noted, may generate incentives to adopt building practices that are
unwise, to put it mildly. More generally, the prospect of disaster may offer incentives for
bad social policies to be implemented in a system of arrangements that offers gains for
profiteers who are major players in influencing the setting of political and economic goals.
Averting disasters, and not merely planning for adaptation to whatever disasters
the global system will risk or ordain, (for example, disasters generated by anthropogenic
global warming or reckless financial speculation), is certainly on the agenda for a critical
sustainable development movement (or a more progressive replacement for sustainable
development). But we all also need to deal collectively with much else, including the use
of sustainable development rhetoric to conceal or distort various genuine problems about
social justice and the environment. Both a more centralized concentration on catastrophes
and a more decentralized attention to varied situations are needed for democratic activism.

15.
Perhaps the central contradiction that contributes to a crisis for sustainable development is
this. As a value system, as represented in the Brundtland Report, albeit questionably and
uncritically reformulated in the 2015 SDGs, with an absence of criticism of what is by 2015
the intensification of neoliberalism, sustainable development could reasonably be regarded
as a plausible if rather overly general value system. However, even the Brundtland Report
diplomatically glosses over major problems about the compatibility of its values with a
global political economy increasingly dominated by global corporate capitalism.
In its phase as the major international values system unopposed and undisciplined
by any truly threatening rival system for political economy and culture, marketized neoliberalism, as acted on by its enthusiasts, increasingly worsens economic inequality,
supports politically undemocratic trends, and damages the environment.
The central conflict appears to have gotten worse between issuing of the
Brundtland Report and the formulation of the 2015 SDGs. This is evidenced in the
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alternating use of sustainable development values for praiseworthy purposes and for
ideological falsification of the global state of affairs and trends. This can be illustrated by
reference to a recent public meditation by Alan AtKisson, a Swedish former businessman
and current Swedish civil servant (as he puts it). He depicts himself (no doubt sincerely)
as a devotee of sustainable development over a thirty-year period, both as a
businessman/consultant, and now as a civil servant in the Swedish government. He regards
sustainable development as having been mainstreamed worldwide, with progressive
results. A telltale sign of ideology is perhaps detectable in AtKisson’s references to
corporate social responsibility as part of the benign widespread influence of sustainable
development thought and practice. He writes:
It took a few decades, but ultimately we—and I strongly
emphasize we because sustainable development started as a small we
that swelled into a global movement—succeeded. Sustainable
development is the mainstream now. Variations from the global
consensus on the need to fight climate change, end poverty, take care of
ecosystems and advance the rights and equality of all people everywhere
are widely seen as aberrations.
Unfortunately, there are still lots of aberrations. But they are no
longer considered the ‘norm.’ The global adoption of the 2030 Agenda
and 17 Sustainable Development Goals at the U.N., in 2015, achieved
that decisively. (AtKisson 2018)
Either Chomsky, Pogge, et al. or AtKisson are closer to the truth. We the authors
of this essay opt to agree with Chomsky, Pogge, et al. about the importance of integrating
a critique of neoliberal ideology into the account of the current status of sustainable
development.

16.
We conclude this paper with a suggestion for a program of research about and critique of
sustainable development as an ideology and set of practices. Research and critique need to
be combined with democratic activism. The many declarations of commitment to
sustainable development around the world deserve analysis and critique, often (not always)
as expressions of ideology in the bad sense. When we compare the declarations with realworld results, we will often be disturbed. But, we should ask, why is it deemed necessary
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for many regimes and institutions to swear allegiance to sustainable development, while
their actual decision-making seems demonstrably to betray the most attractive versions of
sustainable development? We suggest that the reason for this is that there is some
widespread sentiment that there is a global consensus that sustainable development
includes core values (albeit vaguely and ambiguously expressed and internally sometimes
inconsistent) necessary for acknowledgment of the legitimacy of the global system,
dominated as it is increasingly by a version of global capitalism. Some significant weak
points in the global system can be detected and better understood (and acted on for
correction or replacement) by analyzing the distorted instances of support for sustainable
development that are contradicted by actual practices and results. The weak points can
illustrate more local and regional issues that can be publicized to build more popular
activism in favor of sustainable development. That is a praiseworthy populism. Sometimes
there will be a direct connection between more particularized and local issues with
worldwide apocalyptic disaster politics. But often the issues that catalyze popular
democratic engagement for environmentalism and social justice are more particularized
than that, and need not be about catastrophe. The more particularized issues may sooner or
later be connected in the public mind with apocalyptic matters such as environmental
catastrophes resulting from global warming, or financial disasters akin to the 2008 financial
system meltdown. But the crisis of sustainable development pointed to here is more multifaceted than that, and what eventually will generate needed popular democratic resistance
to the excesses of neoliberalism may take shape in unanticipated ways. It should, however,
come to be better understood that without correction of (replacement of) neoliberalism, the
crisis of sustainable development will only grow in seriousness and complexity. That is
one of the most important lessons that well-designed activism can teach a well-informed
and motivated global public.
NOTE
1.

In a book co-authored with a Polish colleague, we co-authors of the current essay have
examined sustainable development in a way that takes account of Polish trends as well
as many other more globalized foci for development issues (Sankowski, Harris, and
Hernik 2016).
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